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THE DEATH OF IMPLIED CAUSES OF ACTION: THE
SUPREME COURT'S RECENT BIVENS
JURISPRUDENCE AND THE EFFECT ON STATE
CONSTITUTIONAL TORT JURISPRUDENCE:
CORRECTIONAL SERVICES CORP. V. MALESKO
ANDREA ROBEDA*
I. INTRODUCTION
The Federal Bill of Rights was designed to codify the civil rights of the citizens
of a newly founded nation and guarantee protection from the government's invasion
of those rights.' Those rights were codified and essentially guaranteed, but they
served as a check on the government, not as a mechanism for individuals to assert
violations of their rights against the government in the courts.2 The idea that an
individual could assert a cause of action and collect damages against a government
official for violation of constitutional rights is a relatively recent phenomenon. The
Supreme Court provided for recovery against government officials for violation of
individual constitutional rights in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the
FederalBureau ofNarcotics.3 Since that decision, the Court has reluctantly implied
causes of action for damages directly under the Constitution. This note seeks to
analyze the reasoning for this reluctance through an analysis of the Court's decision
in CorrectionalServices Corp. v. Malesko.4
In Malesko, the Supreme Court declined to imply a Bivens cause of action under
the Constitution for damages against a private corporation acting under contract
with the Federal Bureau of Prisons.5 The Court held,
There are only two circumstances that warrant an extension of Bivens; to provide
for an otherwise nonexistent cause of action against individual officers alleged
to have acted unconstitutionally, or to provide a cause of action for a plaintiff
who lacked any alternative remedy for harms caused by an individual officer's
unconstitutional conduct.6
The majority noted that since the plaintiff had an alterative cause of action and
allowing recovery would not further the Bivens goal of deterrence, Plaintiff
Malesko should not be permitted recovery under the Bivens theory.7
The most significant aspect of the Malesko decision was the plain expression of
the two contrary approaches to implied causes of action.8 The two approaches first

* Class of 2004, University of New Mexico School of Law. I would like to thank Professor Michael
Browde for his input and guidance throughout the entire writing process. I would also like to thank Susan Johnson
for her continued support, especially throughout the editorial phase of this piece.
1. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 402 n.3 (1971)
(Harlan, J., concurring).
2. Id.
3. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
4. 534 U.S. 61 (2001).
5. Id. at 63.
6. ld. at 68.
7. Id. at 71-73. Malesko could have filed a negligence action against the individual officer or suit in federal
court for injunctive relief.
8. Compare id. at 63 (internal citations omitted) with id. at 76 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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emerged in Bivens, when the Court created an implied cause of action under the
Fourth Amendment.9 The dissent in Malesko presented the issue not as an extension
of Bivens, but as a straightforward application of the Bivens remedy under the
Eighth Amendment to the Constitution." The dissent took the position that federal
agents working for a private corporation, operating under the color of federal law,
should be liable for an Eighth Amendment violation under a Bivens action."
Reminiscent of Justice Harlan's view of the Bill of Rights first articulated in
Bivens, " the Malesko dissenters focused on the judiciary's responsibility to remedy
constitutional violations. 3
This note describes the historical context and origin of the Bivens action and its
subsequent applications, focusing on the contrast between the Court's expansion
and subsequent rejection of implied causes of action. Realizing the rise of private
correctional facilities, this note examines the implications of Malesko, focusing on
the effect the decision will have on state correctional facilities under both 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 actions and implied causes of action under state constitutions.
11. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) operates Community Corrections Services
(CSC), a private entity, and other facilities that house federal prisoners and
detainees.' 4 Le Marquis Community Correctional Center (Le Marquis) is a halfway
house located in New York City operated by CSC under the BOP. 5
John E. Malesko is a former federal inmate who was convicted of federal
securities fraud in December 1992 and was sentenced to an eighteen-month term
under the BOP.' 6 While serving his sentence, Malesko was diagnosed with a heart
condition that limited his ability to engage in physical activity such as climbing
stairs."' The BOP transferred Malesko to Le Marquis in February of 1993, where
he was to serve the remainder of his sentence. 8 At Le Marquis, Malesko was
assigned to living quarters on the fifth floor. 19
In March 1994, CSC instituted a new policy at Le Marquis requiring inmates
residing below the sixth floor to use the staircase rather than the elevator to travel
from the first floor to their rooms.2" Malesko was exempt from this policy due to his
heart condition.2' He alleged that shortly after this policy was enacted, Jorge Urena,
a CSC employee, forbid him to use the elevator to access his room on the fifth

9. Compare Bivens, 403 U.S. at 391-92 with id. at 411-13 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
10. Malesko, 534 U.S. at 75 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer joined the
dissenting opinion.
11. Id. at 76 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
12. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 407 (Harlan, J., concurring).
13. Malesko, 534 U.S. at 80 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
14. Id.at 63.
15. Id. at 64.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
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floor.22 When Malesko protested that he was permitted elevator access due to his
heart condition, Urena adamantly refused him access. Malesko then climbed the
stairs, suffered a heart attack, and fell, injuring his left ear.24
Three years after sustaining his injury, Malesko filed a pro se action against CSC
and unnamed CSC employees in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District
of New York and amended the complaint two years later.25 The amended complaint
alleged that Urena, CSC, and unnamed defendants were "negligent in failing to
obtain requisite medication for [respondent's] condition and were further negligent
by refusing [respondent] the use of the elevator. ' 26 Malesko alleged he injured his
left ear and aggravated a pre-existing condition "[a]s a result of the negligence of
the Defendants. 27 Malesko requested damages of $3 million in anticipated future
damages and punitive damages. 28 The district court treated the amended complaint
as raising claims under Bivens and dismissed the cause of action against CSC
because Bivens only maintained actions against individuals. 29 Therefore, an action
against CSC, as a private corporation, could not be maintained under Bivens. 30 The
court dismissed the remaining allegations against Urena and the unnamed
defendants on statute of limitations grounds.3'
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed in part, reversed in part, and
remanded.32 The court affirmed the dismissal of Malesko's claim against the
individual defendants as barred by the statute of limitations .3' The court of appeals
reversed the lower court with respect to the CSC.34 The court of appeals reasoned
that, despite the Supreme Court's explicit refusal to extend Bivens actions to federal
agencies,35 private entities like the CSC should be held liable under Bivens to
"'accomplish the.. .important Bivens goal of providing a remedy for constitutional
violations."' 3 6 The Second Circuit articulated the important fundamental view of the
Fourth Amendment that was first articulated by Justice Harlan in his concurring
opinion in Bivens.3 7 As will become apparent, this important goal of providing
remedies for constitutional violations eventually fades from the policy goals the
Court later articulates in subsequent Bivens actions.38

22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. Malesko and his attorney filed the amended complaint.
Id. at 65.
Id.
Id.
Id. (relying on FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471 (1994)).

30. Id.

31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. (citing FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471 (1994)).
36. Id. (quoting Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 229 F.3d 374, 380 (2d Cir. 2000)).
37. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 407 (Harlan, J., concurring).
38. See Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228,245 (1994) (awarding damages for violation of due process clause
of the Fifth Amendment under Bivens because there was no alternative cause of action and there were "no special
factors counseling hesitation"); see also Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 22 (1980) (awarding damages for violation
of the Eighth Amendment under Bivens in order to deter such violations). Although those cases permitted recovery
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The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed, holding a Bivens action
would not be extended to provide damages against private corporations acting under
the color of federal law.39
I.HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
In the thirty-two years that followed Bivens, the Court dramatically retreated
from its former position on constitutional torts."n The current Court has radically
drawn back from the expansive view of constitutional tort jurisprudence articulated
in Davis v. Passman.4 1 This shift is expressed in the Court's most recent opinion,

the five-to-four decision of Malesko. An examination of Bivens, and the cases
leading up to Malesko, illustrates the Court's unwillingness to imply a cause of
action.
A. An Implied Cause of Action Is Created
In Bivens, the Supreme Court was presented with a cause of action for damages
arising out of a violation of the plaintiff's Fourth Amendment rights under the
federal Constitution. 2 Bivens alleged he was subjected to unlawful (warrantless)
entry of his home, search, and subsequent arrest, without probable cause and in
front of his wife and children.4 3 He requested that, upon proof of injury as a result
of the violation of his Fourth Amendment rights, he be awarded damages." The
Court granted his request and cited three reasons for doing so.45
The Court reasoned that the protective scope of the Fourth Amendment applied
to violations of constitutional rights in both state and federal courts of law.46 "Our
cases have long since rejected the notion that the Fourth Amendment proscribes
only such conduct as would, if engaged by private persons, be condemned by state
law."47 Perhaps the Court was compelled to this conclusion given its decision in
Monroe v. Pape.48 If individuals could bring causes of actions against state agents

under Bivens, the important goal of providing remedies for constitutional violations was not the policy reason
behind either decision.
39. Malesko, 534 U.S. at 66.
40. CompareBush v.Lucas, 462 U.S. 367 (1983) (holding that, where Congress had created an "elaborate
remedial scheme," an employee of the federal government could not sue his superior for alleged violation of his
First Amendment rights through a Bivens action), with Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412 (1988) (holding that
a Bivens action would not be implied for alleged due process violation of the Fifth Amendment where damages
were not included in an "elaborate remedial scheme" devised by Congress), and FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471
(1994) (holding that Bivens action cannot be brought against a federal agency).
41. 442 U.S. 288 (1979).
42. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 389.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 392-96. First, "[o]ur cases have long since rejected the notion that the Fourth Amendment
proscribes only such conduct as would if engaged in by private persons, be condemned by state law." Id. at 392.
Second, "[t]he interests protected by state laws regulating trespass and the invasion of privacy, and those protected
by the Fourth Amendment's guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures, may be inconsistent or even
hostile." Id. at 394. And finally, "(t]hat damages may be obtained for injuries consequent upon a violation of the
Fourth Amendment by federal officers should hardly seem a surprising proposition." Id. at 395.
46. Id. at 392.
47. Id.
48. 365 U.S. 167 (1961) (holding that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 creates a federal remedy cognizable in federal
court, and that remedy is available even if the official's conduct is wholly unauthorized under state law).
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for violating constitutional rights, individuals could also bring a similar cause of
action against a federal agent.49
The interests protected by state laws regulating trespass were inconsistent
with
the guarantees protected by the Fourth Amendment and thus Bivens was without
an
alternative remedy.5" Since federal agents hold a distinct position of authority,
they
are generally permitted entrance into the home because refusal would be
futile or
even result in a crime.5 Conversely, private individuals lack any authority
other
than their own and must obtain consent to enter the home or face liability
under
52
state trespass laws. The Court drew a distinction between these two interests:
the
Fourth Amendment guarantees rights against unreasonable searches and
seizures,
but state trespass law enforces the individual's right to refuse entry into the
home.
Since federal officers are in the position of authority, they can usually
obtain
3
admittance. Accordingly, because Bivens was subjected to an unreasonable
search
and seizure by federal agents, he had no remedy under state trespass law.54
The
Court concluded, "In such cases there is no safety for the citizen, except
in
the
protection of the judicial tribunals, for rights which have been invaded
by the
officers of the government professing to act in its name. 55
Damages have been the historical means of redress for "an invasion of personal
interests in liberty,"56 and "where legal rights have been invaded, and a
federal
statute provides for a general right to sue for such invasion, federal courts
may use
any available remedy to make good the wrong done." 57 The federal courts
have
power to grant damages for violations of the Fourth Amendment and,
thus, the
power to grant a general right of access to federal courts.s8
The Court recognized that a claim for damages against federal officers
for
violations of the federal Constitution might not be appropriate in all instances.59
First, implying a cause of action for damages might be inappropriate when
a case
presents "special factors counseling hesitation in the absence of affirmative
action
by Congress."60 The Court provided two examples of such special factors.6
The

49. Id. In this case, thirteen Chicago police officers broke into the Monroe's
home, routed them from bed,
made them stand naked in the living room, and ransacked every room. Mr.
Monroe was then taken to the police
station and detained on "open" charges for 10 hours, while he was interrogated
about a two-day-old murder; he was
not taken before a magistrate, though one was accessible; he was not permitted
to call his family or attorney; and
he was subsequently released without criminal charges against him. The officers
acted without a search warrant
"under color of the statutes, ordinances, regulations, customs, and usages"
of Illinois and the City of Chicago.
Federal jurisdiction was asserted under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Court held
that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 creates a federal
remedy cognizable in federal court and that remedy is available even if the official's
conduct is wholly unauthorized
under state law. Id. at 389.
50. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 394.
51. Id. at 397.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 395.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 397.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 396-97.
60. Id. at 396.
61. Id.
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first is when a question of "federal fiscal policy" is involved.62 The second is in
actions against congressional employees for exceeding the authority delegated to
them by Congress.63 Second, the Bivens Court indicated that a damages remedy
might not be appropriate where Congress addressed specific types of constitutional
violations by creating a statutory scheme intending to be a substitute for a judicial
remedy. 64
In his concurrence, Justice Harlan articulated two views of the Fourth
Amendment, one instrumental and the other fundamental, and those views are the
heart of the Bivens rationale. 65 The instrumental view is deterrence and prevention
of police abuse.6 6 The fundamental view is the recognition that constitutional
violations require their own remedy and federal courts are the only appropriate
means of effectuating that relief through protection of those rights.67 Justice Harlan
reiterated the important goal of deterring unconstitutional conduct on the part of
federal officers.6 8 He then added a separate policy goal in favor of implying a cause
of action for damages directly under the Fourth Amendment.69 Justice Harlan stated,
"The appropriateness of according Bivens compensatory relief does not turn simply
on the deterrent effect liability will have on federal official conduct."7 He noted the
importance of the "personal interests" protected by the Fourth Amendment and the
necessity of protecting those personal interests of "privacy."'" Justice Harlan
concluded, "the judiciary has a particular responsibility to assure the vindication of
constitutional interests such as those embraced by the Fourth Amendment."7 2 Justice
Harlan reasoned that since the Court had authorized damages in order to effectuate
the congressional underpinning of a statute,73 the Court could similarly authorize
damages relief under the provisions of the Constitution.7 4 According to this
fundamental view, it is the federal judiciary's role to "vindicate social policies
which, by virtue of their inclusion in the Constitution, are aimed predominately at
restraining the Government as an instrument of the popular will."75
Justice Harlan's fundamental view did not necessarily compel the result he
reached in Bivens. He concluded that, because Bivens was without an alternative
remedy, he must be monetarily compensated: "It is apparent that some form of
damages is the only possible remedy for someone in Bivens' alleged position."'76

62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
concurring).
65. Id. at 398 (Harlan, J.,
66. Id. at 407-08 (Harlan, J., concurring).
67. Id. at 408-12 (Harlan, J., concurring).
68. Id. at 408 (Harlan, J., concurring).
69. Id. at 399 (Harlan, J., concurring).
70. Id.
71. Id. at 408 (Harlan, J., concurring).
72. Id. at 407 (Harlan, J., concurring).
73. Id. at 402 (Harlan, J., concurring) (citing J.1. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964)) (holding that a
private party has a right to sue under section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934).
74. Id. at 403 (Harlan, J., concurring) ("But I do not think that the fact that the interest is protected by the
Constitution rather than statute or common law justifies the assertion that federal courts are powerless to grant
damages in the absence of explicit congressional action authorizing the remedy.").
75. Id. at 404 (Harlan, J., concurring).
76. Id.
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Injunctive relief did not adequately remedy the harm done to Bivens, nor was a suit
against the government possible." The other judicially created remedy, the
exclusionary rule,78 would also not remedy the harm done to Bivens because he was
innocent.79 Therefore, "[f]or people in Bivens' shoes, it is damages or nothing."80
Justice Harlan reached this conclusion because of his fundamental view of
constitutional rights and the recognition that the federal judiciary was authorized
to afford monetary relief for constitutional violations.8"
Even though the next two cases represent the "high-water mark" of the Court's
Bivens jurisprudence, the fundamental view that was so central in Bivens had begun
83
to fade.82 This fading signals the limitation of Bivens actions that is yet to come.
B. The Implied Cause ofAction "Extended"
The Court's two decisions following Bivens suggested that the implication of a
damages remedy under the Constitution would be close to automatic. In doing so,
the Court effectively created the two hypothetical situations posited by the Bivens
Court into solid exceptions, and where those exceptions did not apply, Bivens
recovery was permitted.84
Davis v. Passman85 presented a Bivens action arising out of the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment.86 In Davis, the Court awarded damages but
qualified the Bivens holding and created a test. 87 "In appropriate circumstances a
federal district court may provide relief in damages for violation of constitutional
rights if there are 'no special factors counseling hesitation in the absence of
affirmative action by Congress."' 88 The Court fashioned the test based on one of the
hypothetical situations originally articulated in Bivens. 89 The Court used the same
reasoning used in Bivens. 90 Since Davis had no alternative cause of action, "it is
damages or nothing."9' Further, "although a suit against a Congressman for
77. Id.
78. Under the exclusionary rule, all evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the
Constitution is inadmissible in federal and state court. Mapp v. Ohio, 376 U.S. 643 (1961).
79. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 410.
80. Id.
81.

See Susan Brandes, Reinventing Bivens: The Self-Executing Constitution, 68 So. CAL. L. REV. 289

(1995) (examining Bivens as standing for the proposition that judicial enforcement ofconstitutional rights through
monetary damages should not depend on action (or inaction) by the political branches).
82. The fading of the fundamental view is demonstrated in Davis v. Passman,442 U.S. 228, 245 (1994)
and Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 22 (1980).

83. See Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367 (1983); Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412 (1988); FDIC v. Meyer,
510 U.S. 471 (1994).

84. See Davis, 442 U.S. at 245 (holding that "[in appropriate circumstances a federal district court may
provide relief in damages for violation of constitutional rights if there are 'no special factors counseling hesitation
in the absence of affirmative action by Congress"'); see also Carlson, 446 U.S. at 18 (holding that Bivens permits
recovery against federal officials, in federal court, for violations of constitutional rights unless one ofthe two Bivens
exceptions applies).

85. 442 U.S. 228, 244 (1979).
86. Id. That case involved a dispute between a former congressman and his former assistant who alleged
that he discriminated against her on the basis of her sex. Id. at 230.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

Id. at 245.
Id. (quoting Bivens, 403 U.S. at 396) (internal citations omitted).
Id. at 246-47 (quoting Bivens, 403 U.S. at 397).
Id. at 245.
Id. (quoting Bivens, 403 U.S. at 410) (Harlan, J., concurring).
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putatively unconstitutional actions taken in the course of his official conduct does
raise special concerns counseling hesitation, we hold that these concerns are
coextensive with the protections afforded by the Speech or Debate Clause."92
Finally, the Court reasoned there was no explicit declaration by Congress that
claimants in Davis's position should not be allowed to recover damages.93 The
dissenters, including the future Chief Justice Rehnquist, foreshadowed the
limitations that were to come. 94 Relying on a separation of powers rationale, the
Justices thought they had a judicial duty to hesitate in implying causes of action.95
Similarly, in Carlson v. Green96 the Court further qualified the Bivens holding.97
In that case, the mother of a deceased federal prisoner brought suit alleging he
suffered personal injuries because federal officials violated his Due Process, Equal
Protection, and Eighth Amendment rights.9" The Court held a Bivens remedy was
available, even though there was a possible suit against the United States under the
Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA). 99 The Court construed Bivens as allowing
recovery against federal officials, in federal court, for violations of constitutional
rights unless one of the two Bivens "exceptions" applied."t° The Court cited four
additional factors that demonstrated that a Bivens remedy was appropriate.0 ° First,
"the Bivens remedy, in addition to compensating victims, serves as a deterrent
purpose and since Bivens remedies are recoverable against individuals as opposed
to FTCA remedies against the United States it is a more effective deterrent than
[the] FTCA."' 2 Second, punitive damages are available in Bivens actions but are
not in FTCA actions.'0 3 Third, a plaintiff can opt for a jury in a Bivens suit but not
in an FTCA action.'0 4 Finally, an action under the FTCA depends upon whether
state law permits a cause of action'1 5 and the action is therefore subject to state law.
The Court held that liability of federal officials for violations of a citizen's
constitutional rights should be governed by uniform rules of federal law. 1 6

92. Id. at 246.
93. Id. at 247.
94. Id. at 249 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
95. Id.
96. 446 U.S. 14 (1980).
97. Id. at 18.
98. Id. at 16.
99. Id. at 23.
100. The Bivens "exceptions" were articulated as applying where "special factors counsel[] hesitation in the
absence of affirmative action by Congress," and "when the defendants show that Congress has provided an
alternative remedy which it explicitly declares to be a substitute for recovery directly under the Constitution and
viewed as equally effective." Id. at 18-19. Neither was held to apply in Carlson since there were no special factors
counseling hesitation, and the federal officials had qualified immunity to ensure that such suits would not inhibit
them from performing their official duties. Id. at 19 (quoting Davis, 245 U.S. at 245-47). Nor was there an explicit
declaration from Congress that the Federal Tort Claims Act was to supplant Bivens recovery. In fact, the Court
noted that the 1974 amendments to the FTCA "made it crystal clear that Congress view[ed] FTCA and Bivens as
parallel, complementary causes of action." Id. at 18-19.
101. Id. at 20.
102. Id. at 21.
103. Id. at 22.
104. Id.

105. Id. at 23.
106. Id.
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The limitation on implied causes of action was foreshadowed in Carlson,just as
in Davis.10 7 In his dissenting opinion in Carlson,Justice Rehnquist highlighted the
reasons against implying a cause of action. " These reasons would soon become the
majority view of Bivens actions rather than the dissenting view.'0 9 Justice Rehnquist
noted the disparaging views and the controversy that surrounded Bivens actions: "0
Bivens is a decision by a closely divided court, unsupported by the confirmation
of time, and, as a result of this weak precedential and doctrinal foundation, it
cannot be viewed as a check on the living process of striking a wise balance
between liberty and order as few cases come here for adjudication."'
Justice Rehnquist reaffirmed the view of the dissenters in Davis, stating that
creating causes of action is an "exercise of power that the Constitution does not give
us."M' In the years following, what was formally only a foreshadowing would come
to the forefront.
C. The "Exception" Becomes the Rule
In Bush v. Lucas,"3 the Court held that an aerospace engineer employed by the
federal government could not sue his superior for violation of his First Amendment
rights." 4 The Court noted Congress had not expressly denied a private cause of
action or provided an adequate alternative remedy but concluded there were
"special factors counseling hesitation.""' 5 Congress constructed an "elaborate
comprehensive scheme" that prescribed the scope of relief for federal employees
whose First Amendment rights had been violated by their superiors.16 The Court
focused its analysis not on the merits of that scheme, but on who should decide
whether such a remedy should be provided. 1 7 Given the extensive history of
congressional effort to alleviate the "problem of politically-motivated removals,"" "
the Court concluded the system should not be "augmented by the creation of a new
judicial remedy.""' 9 Although that system did not allow for damages, the Court
concluded it provided "meaningful remedies for employees" 2 0 and was convinced
that "Congress is in a better position to decide whether or not the public interest

107. Id. at 31 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
108. Id. at 34-54 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
109. Id. at 32 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 34 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
113. 462 U.S. 367 (1983).
114. Id. at 368.
115. Id. at 378-79 (citing Bivens, 403 U.S. at 396). "When those words were first used in Bivens, we
illustrated our meaning by referring to United States v. StandardOil Co., 332 U.S. 301, 311,316, 67 S. Ct. 1604,
1609, 1612, (1972) (per curium) and United States v. Gilman, 347 U.S. 507, 74 S. Ct. 695 (1954)." Id. at 379.
"The special factors counseling hesitation in the creation of a new remedy in StandardOil and Gilman did not
concern the merits of the particular remedy that was sought. Rather, they related to the question of who should
decide whether such a remedy should be provided." Id. at 380.
116. Id.at 385-86.
117. Id.at 379.
118. Id.at 383.
119. Id.at 388.
120. Id. at 386.

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 33

would be served by creating [a damages remedy]." 2 ' Justice Marshall concurred in
the opinion 22 but wrote separately to emphasize that in his view "a different case
would be presented if Congress had not created a comprehensive scheme that was
specifically designed to provide full compensation and that affords a remedy that
is substantially as effective as a damages action."' 23
The Court extended the approach of Bush in Schweiker v. Chilicky' 24 In
Schweiker, the Court refused to imply a Bivens action for an alleged due process
violation of the Fifth Amendment in the denial of social security disability
benefits. 25
' The Court found the remedy was not included in the "elaborate remedial
scheme"' 26 devised by Congress and there were "special factors counseling
hesitation in implying one."' 27 The Court noted that Congress had paid "frequent
and intense" attention to the problems that had arisen in the administration of social
security benefits.' The Court equated that congressional attention with the
attention the Court noted in Bush.'29 Given the amount of congressional attention
and the history of efforts by Congress to alleviate problems in the administration of
social security benefits, the Court declined, as it had in Bush, "'to create a new
substantive legal liability.. .because we are convinced that Congress is in a better
position to decide whether or not the public interest would be served by creating
it.'1.30 Accordingly, the Court found special factors counseling hesitation in
implying a cause of action for damages.'
In FederalDeposit Insurance Corp. (FDIC)v. Meyer,'32 the Court refused to
permit a Bivens recovery against a federal agency.' In that case, an employee of
a failed savings and loan association, allegedly discharged in violation of due
process, sued the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation.' The Court
unanimously refused to permit recovery against the agency.' 35 The absence of
authority supporting recovery and the underlying logic of Bivens did not support

121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

Id. at 390.
Id. (Marshall, J., concurring). Justice Blackmun joined the concurrence.
Id. at 390 (Marshall, J.,
concurring).
487 U.S. 412 (1988).
Id. at 414.
Id.
Id. at 423.
In sum, the concept of "special factors counseling hesitation in the absence of affirmative action
by Congress" has proved to include an appropriate judicial deference to indications that
congressional inaction has not been inadvertent. When the design of a Government program
suggests that Congress has provided what it considers adequate remedial mechanisms for
constitutional violations that may occur in the course of its administration, we have not created
additional Bivens remedies.

Id.
128. Id. at 425.
129. The Bush Court devoted a greater part of the opinion to documenting the history of the civil services
remedies, especially noting, the "[c]ongressional attention [paid] to the problem of politically-motivated
removals..... Bush, 462 U.S. at 380-88.
130. Schweiker, 487 U.S. at 427 (quoting Bush, 462 U.S. at 390) (internal citations omitted).
131. Id. at429.
132. 510 U.S. 471 (1994).
133. Id. at 486.
134. id. at 474.
135. Id. at 471.
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such an extension.' 36 The Court noted its hesitation in former cases from extending
Bivens into new categories. 137 The central reasons for denying recovery against the
federal agency were twofold.'38 Primarily, permitting actions against federal
agencies would result in litigation against the agencies alone.'39 This would allow
claimants to avoid qualified immunity protection invoked by many Bivens
defendants and circumvent the Bivens goal of deterring the conduct of the
individual. 4 0In addition, the special considerations "exception" applied because the
creation of a damages remedy against the federal agency would create a potentially
enormous financial burden for the federal government, a matter affecting fiscal
policy that is better left to Congress."'
In Bush and Schweiker, the Court determined that if Congress provided a
remedial statutory scheme and congressional attention had been dedicated to the
problem, demonstrated by a history of congressional effort to alleviate the problem,
there were special factors counseling hesitation and the Court refused to imply a
cause of action.'4 2 While recognizing that Congress had not explicitly provided a
statutory mechanism as a substitute for a judicial remedy, the Court examined the
congressional remedy provided and determined there were special factors
counseling hesitation. "'In considering the special factors, the Court looked at the
remedy Congress provided and essentially determined that given the congressional
effort to afford one, the Court should hesitate in creating ajudicial remedy because
Congress was better suited to determining whether one should be created.'44 In
Meyer, the Court used the special factors consideration as the rule and held that the
special factors foreclosed relief without first considering if an alternative cause of

action existed. 145

Meyer and the Bivens line of cases following Carlson indicate a trend that the
current Court is more than hesitant to imply a cause of action where Congress has
not explicitly provided one. 146 This trend toward congressional deference extends
beyond the Bivens context. 1"' An examination of the two cases that follows only

136. Id.
at 484.
137. See Schweiker, 487 U.S. at 421.
138. Meyer, 510 U.S. at 485-86.
139. Id.at 485.
140. Id. at 484.
141. Id. at485.
142. Bush, 462 U.S. at 383-85; Schweiker, 487 U.S. at 423-25.
143. Schweiker, 487 U.S. at 425. "Thecasebeforeus cannot reasonablybedistinguished from Bush v. Lucas.
Here exactly as in Bush, Congress has failed to provide for 'complete relief."' Id. (citing Bush, 462 U.S. at 372).
"Congress, however, has addressed the problems created by state agencies' wrongful termination of disability
benefits." Id. at 429.
144. See Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Bivens, Chilicky, and ConstitutionalDamages Claims,75 VA. L. REV. 1117
(1989) (critiquing the "special factors" analysis).
145. Meyer, 510 U.S. at 486.
146. See Betsy J. Grey, Preemption of Bivens Claims: How Clearly Must Congress Speak?, 70 WASH. U.
L.Q. 1987 (1992) (arguing that Bivens actions are available except where Congress clearly states its intent to
supersede them); George D. Brown, Letting StatutoryTails Wag ConstitutionalDogs-Havethe Bivens Dissenters
Prevailed?,64 IND. L.J. 263 (1989) (analyzing these cases and their role in the general conception of federal
common law).
147. See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 285 (2001) (holding that there is no private right of action
to enforce disparate-impact regulations promulgated under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964); see also
Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. _, 122 S. Ct. 2268, 2272 (2002) (holding student's private right of action was
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further demonstrates the limitations the current Court has placed on litigants
seeking damages through implied causes of action, either statutory or constitutional
rights.
The Supreme Court declined to imply a private cause of action under a federal
statute in Alexanderv. Sandoval.'4 8 The Court held there is no private right of action
to enforce disparate-impact regulations promulgated under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964. 49 Pursuant to Alabama's 1990 state constitutional amendment
making "English the official language of the state," and to advance public safety,
the Alabama Department of Public Safety changed its policy and administered
driver's license tests only in English. 5 ' Due to this English-only policy, Sandoval
sued under Justice Department regulations forbidding contractors with the federal
government from engaging in conduct that has a disparate impact, based on race,
gender, or national origin. 5 ' The Court noted the narrow issue presented by the
case, "whether there is a private cause of action to enforce the regulation."'5 In the
analysis of Title VII, the Court stated that whether there is a private right of action
to enforce a disparate impact regulation promulgated pursuant to section 602 is an
open question, even though private individuals may sue to enforce the purposeful
discrimination provision of section 601 of the Act. 5 ' The Court began its inquiry
by observing that the earlier understanding that "it is the duty of the courts[] to
provide such remedies as are necessary to make effective the congressional
purpose" was no longer accepted. 5 4 That understanding was first expressed in J.L
Case Co. v. Borak' and had been rejected in favor of a strict adherence to
"congressional intent" as expressed by the words of the applicable statute. 156 The
Court found the search involving the "text and structure" of Title VII had no "rights
creating" language in section 602 because it focused on neither the people being
protected nor the persons regulated.' The language focused on the regulating
agency.' Furthermore, the duties imposed on the regulator by section 602
contradicted a congressional intent to create a private right of action, and later
amendments added no contrary legislative intent.'59 Given the Court's position that
the judiciary's task is to search out the intent of Congress, not to create rights that
Congress has not created, the Court found no such congressional intent and
foreclosed a private cause of action. "6

foreclosed because the relevant portions of the Family Education Rights and Privacy Act created no enforceable
personal rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983).
148. 532 U.S. 275, 292 (2001).
149. Id. at 285.
150. Id. at 275.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 279-83 (citing to section 601).
153. Id. at 280-83.
154. Id.at 287.
155. 377 U.S. 426, 433 (1964) (holding that a private party had a right to sue under section 14(a) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934).
156. Alexander, 532 U.S. at 287 (quoting Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975)) (holding that no private cause
of action for damages may be inferred from a criminal prohibition in the Federal Election Campaign Act).
157. Id. at 288-89.
158. Id.
159. Id. at291-92.
160. Id.at 293.
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The Court created a parallelism between implied causes of action and private
rights of action under rights conferring statutes.16" ' Although 42 U.S.C. § 1983
allowed for vindication of federal statutory rights, the Court declined to imply rights
under a federal statute. 6 2 In Gonzaga University v. Doe,163 the Court held that a
student's private right of action was foreclosed because the relevant provisions of
the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA) created no enforceable
personal rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. " A student enrolled at Gonzaga intended
to become an elementary school teacher and needed an affidavit of good moral
character from the university. 165 The teacher certification specialist at the university
overheard a discussion that the student had engaged in sexual misconduct.' 66 The
certification specialist launched an investigation, contacted the state teacher
certification agency, revealed the name of the student, and told the student he would
not get the requisite affidavit from the university. 167 The student sued in state court
under section 1983, alleging a violation of FERPA. 168 Steadfast in its trend toward
limiting private causes of action, the Court noted that anything short of an
unambiguously conferred right would not support a cause of action under section
1983.169 The Court went a step further and drew a direct parallel between
section
1983 cases and implied rights of action cases: "our implied right of action cases
should guide the determination of whether a statute confers rights enforceable under
§ 1983. ' ' 7° The Court set the stage for an analysis akin to that of Alexander, an
analysis that strictly interpreted Congress's intent to provide a private right of action
where one was not explicitly provided.' 7' The Gonzaga Court reasoned that, while
the inquiry into an implied cause of action and the inquiry into what "rights" are
enforceable through section 1983 may be different, they overlap in one meaningful
respect: the Court must determine whether Congress intended to create a federal
right.' The Court found that for a statute to create such rights it must be "phrased
in terms of the persons benefited."' In Alexander the statute lacked "rights
creating" language.' 74 FERPA spoke only in terms of institutional policy and
practice and provided review and enforcement mechanisms through the department
of education.' 75 The Court concluded that if Congress intended to create new rights
enforceable under section 1983 it must do so unambiguously, "no less and no more

161. See Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at ___, 122 S. Ct. at 2275.
162. Id. at -, 122 S. Ct. at 2276.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id. The student sued under Rev. Stat. § 1979, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994 ed., supp.
V) to enforce
provisions of the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974, 88 Stat. 571, 20 U.S.C.
§ 1231g, which
prohibits the federal funding of educational institutions that have a policy or practice of releasing
education records
to unauthorized persons. Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at -, 122 S. Ct. at 2273.
169. Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at
, 122 S. Ct. at 2275.
170. Id.
171. Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at
, 122 S. Ct. at 2276.
172. Id. at __, 122 S. Ct. at 2275.
173. Id.
174. Id. (quotingAlexander, 532 U.S. at 288-89).
175. Id.
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than what is required for Congress to create new rights enforceable under an
'
implied private right of action." 176
Each of these cases is a clear demonstration of the Court's refusal to imply
causes of action where Congress has not explicitly granted them the authority,
regardless of policy considerations.' 77 The two former cases, combined with the
Bivens line of cases previously discussed, set the stage for the Malesko opinion. In
Malesko, the Court furthers the limitations on implied private causes of action to a
new category.' 78
IV. RATIONALE
The situation in Malesko is unique and presents a possible new problem for the
enforcement of constitutional rights against federal officials. Before examining the
potential problem, it is essential to understand the Court's dilemma.
A. Majority's Position
The theme of the majority's opinion is caution; hence, the issue in the case is
analyzed as an extension of Bivens. 7 9 '"The caution toward extending Bivens
remedies into any new context, a caution consistently and repeatedly recognized for
three decades, forecloses an extension here."' 80 Recognizing that Bivens had only
been "extended" twice, in Davis and Carlson, the majority found Malesko's
situation was distinguishable from either of those situations.' 8 ' "Since Carlson,we
have consistently refused
to extend Bivens liability to any new context or new
' 82
category of defendants."'
The Court reasoned that suits against private corporations would not serve the
deterrence goal of Bivens, at least not in the same way as suits against the officers
in their individual capacities.' 83 However, the majority did not address the other
policy goal underlying the Bivens rationale, namely the fundamental aspect of the
Fourth Amendment articulated by Justice Harlan.' 84
Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist also reasoned the holding in
Meyer "made clear that the threat of suit against an individual's employer was not
the kind of deterrence contemplated by Bivens."'85 Chief Justice Rehnquist
analogized that since neither the federal agency nor the corporation is an individual

176. Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at __, 122 S. Ct. at 2279.
177. See Alexander, 532 U.S. at 287. "Having sworn off the habit of venturing beyond Congress' intent, we
will not accept respondent's invitation to have one last drink." Id. See also Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at -, 122 S. Ct.
at 2277. "Accordingly, where the text and structure of a statute provide no indication that Congress intends to
create new individual rights, there is no basis for a private suit, whether under § 1983 or under an implied right of
action." Id.
178. Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61 (2001).
179. Id. at 74.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 70.
182. Id. at 68.
183. Id. at 70-71.
184. Recall Justice Harlan's fundamental view: "the judiciary has a particular responsibility to assure the
vindication of constitutional interests such as those embraced by the Fourth Amendment," Bivens, 403 U.S. at 407
(Harlan, J., concurring).
185. Malesko, 534 U.S. at 70.

Summer 2003]

IMPLIED CAUSES OF ACTION

neither should be subject to Bivens liability.'86 "[I]f a corporate claimant is available
for suit, claimants will focus their collection efforts on it, and not the individual
directly responsible for the alleged injury."' 87 The Chief Justice concluded the
Bivens deterrence goal would not be achieved if private corporations were available
for suit.'88
Additionally, the Court noted, "Malesko is not a plaintiff in search of a remedy
as in Bivens and Davis"'8 9 since there were other alternative causes of action
available to Malesko.' 90 "It was conceded at oral argument that alternative remedies
are at least as great as, and in many cases greater than, anything that could be had
under Bivens."' 9' The majority argued Malesko could have filed a grievance with
the BOP against the officers for an injunction or pursued a parallel tort remedy
against them.'92
The majority argued and concluded that since Malesko had alternative remedies
available to him that simply were not pursued, 93 his situation was not similar
enough to Davis or Carlsonto allow a cause of action under Bivens. 94 Instead, the
Court stated that the "extension" of Bivens sought by
Malesko thwarted the
95
deterrence goals of Bivens and could not be permitted.1
B. Dissent's Position
The dissent's first point of contention with the majority's opinion was with the
manner in which the issue was framed: "the question presented by this case is
whether the Court should create an exception to the straightforward application of
Bivens and Carlson, not whether it should be extend[ed].' 96 While the majority
relied heavily on Meyer, the three dissenting Justices needed to distinguish it.197 The
Meyer holding does not lead to the outcome reached by the majority.'98 Rather,
Meyer drew a distinction between "federal agents" and an "agency of the Federal
Government,""' yet the majority used Meyer as precedent to create an analogy
between an agency of the federal government and a private corporation." °
Furthermore, the Bivens "exception" of special factors counseling hesitation applied
in Meyer because there were special concerns that the damages sought directly from
federal agencies would create a potentially enormous financial burden for the

186. Id. at 71.
187. Id.

188. Id.
189. Id. at 72-73.
190. Id. at 72.

191. Id.
192. Id. at 73-74. Note that in Bivens injunctive relief did not adequately remedy the harm done. Bivens, 403
U.S. at 410 (Harlan, J., concurring).
193. The majority argued that Malesko could have filed a grievance with the BOP against the officers for
an injunction or pursued a parallel tort remedy against them. Malesko, 534 U.S. at 74.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 75 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

197.
198.
199.
200.

Justice Stevens wrote the dissent, joined by Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer. Id.
Id. at 77 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id. at 76 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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federal government.2"' These concerns simply do not apply to private corporations.2" 2 Therefore, the dissent concluded the Meyer holding did not preclude relief
for Malesko. °3
According to the dissent, the majority incorrectly concluded that for a Bivens
remedy to be available there must be no other cause of action available.0 4 On the
contrary, the dissent noted Bivens theoretically had a cause of action against the
individual officer under state tort law, and yet the Court held Bivens had an implied
cause of action under the Fourth Amendment.2 5 Similarly, the dissent pointed out
that in Carlson there was an alternative cause of action available under the FTCA
and yet a cause of action was implied under the Eighth Amendment.2 6 The dissent
warned that the majority's reliance on state tort law and alternative remedies
undermined uniformity of federal law and jeopardized the protection of
constitutional rights.20 7 The dissent sought to reapply the fundamental view
originally articulated by Justice Harlan in his concurrence in Bivens, the view that
it was the federal judiciary's role to assure the vindication of constitutional rights.20 8
Justice Stevens stated, "Like Justice Harlan, I think it 'entirely proper that these
injures be compensable according to uniform rules of federal law, especially in light
of the very large element of federal law which must in any event control the scope
of official defenses to liability." 20 9
Providing relief against private corporations is not a disservice to the Bivens goal
of deterrence. 1 0 The dissent in Malesko argued that private corporations are
distinguishable from federal agencies because the "organizational structure" of
private prisons "is one subject to the competitive pressures that normally help
private firms adjust their behavior in response to the incentives that tort suits
provide-pressures not necessarily present in government departments."2i'
Consequently, the dissent argued the majority's opinion will encourage privately
run correctional facilities to implement cost-saving policies that will jeopardize
constitutional rights.2"
Providing liability in the present case would mean that prisoners in both private
and public institutions would be unable to sue the principal, the government, but
would be permitted to sue the primary federal agent, either the government official
or the corporation acting under color of federal law.2" 3 According to the dissent, the
majority's decision produced asymmetry since state prisoners may sue a private

201. Id.
202. Id. at 81 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
203. Id. at 78 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
204. Id.
205. id. at 79 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
206. Id.
207. Id. at 81 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
208. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 407 (Harlan, J., concurring).
209. Malesko, 534 U.S. at 79-80 (quoting Bivens, 403 U.S. at 409) (internal citations omitted).
210. Id. at 80-81.
211. Id. (quoting Richardson v. McKnight, 521 U.S. 399, 412 (1997)) (holding that private prison guards
who are employees of a private prison management firm in contract with the state to operate a prison are not
entitled to qualified immunity from suit by prisoners charging a violation of section 1983).

212. Id. at 81.
213. Id.
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prison for deprivation of constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, while federal
prisoners are denied a remedy for such a deprivation. 1 4 The dissent recognized the
Court had never indicated that actions under section 1983 and Bivens were
identical, yet a parallelism has been acknowledged.215
Finally, the dissent suggested the true reason behind the majority's opinion was
simply disagreement with the Bivens holding.
It is apparent from the Court's critical discussion of the thoughtful opinions of
Justice Harlan and his contemporaries, and from its erroneous statement of the
question presented by this case as whether Bivens "should be extended"...that
the driving force21behind
the Court's decision is a disagreement with the holding
6
in Bivens itself.

This is unacceptable since Congress has practically ratified the Bivens remedy and
stare decisis precludes such treatment. 2 7 "[A] rule that has been such a wellrecognized part of our law
for over 30 years should be accorded full respect by the
21 8
Members of this Court.,

V. IMPLICATIONS
The symmetry argument proffered by the dissent hinted at the problem that will
inevitably surface: the problem posed by private prisons acting under the color of
federal law. 219 "Indeed, a tragic consequence of today's decision is the clear
incentive it gives to corporate managers of privately operated custodial institutions
to adopt cost-saving policies that jeopardize the constitutional rights of the tens of
thousands of inmates in their custody. 22 ° Under Malesko, federal prisoners will not
be permitted to recover from the corporation itself.22' Instead, they will have to
pursue a traditional Bivens claim against the officers in their individual capacities.222
The majority declines to "extend" such a cause of action on separation of powers
grounds. 223 "Whether it makes sense to impose a cause of asymmetrical liability
'
costs on private prison facilities is a question for Congress, not us, to decide."224
This rationale ignores the role the federal judiciary must play in assuring
constitutional violations are remedied.225 Until Congress recognizes such a cause of
action, federal prisoners in private prisons are left in limbo. The gravity of this

214. Id. at 82 (citing Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 936-37 (1982)) (permitting suit under
section 1983 against private corporations exercising "state action").
215. Id. at 82 (citing Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 499 (1978)) (holding federal executive officials
entitled to qualified immunity in Bivens suits).
216. Id. at 82-83.
217. Id. at 83 (citing Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 19-20 (1980)).
218. Id.
219. Id. at 81 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
220. Id.
221. Id. at 63.
222. Id. at 72-74.
223. Id. at 72.
224. Id.
225. See Bivens, 403 U.S. at 407 (Harlan, J., concurring).
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problem is readily apparent once an examination of the increase in the number of
private prisons is realized.226
The effect Malesko will have on prisoners housed in correctional facilities
operating under the color of state law is of even greater significance. While Malesko
resolved the issue of whether a federal cause of action against a private corporation
acting under the color of federal law is available to litigants whose constitutional
rights have been violated, the parallel issue at the state level may remain
unresolved.227 There are two options for litigants seeking to recover damages
against private corporations acting under the color of state law.228 The litigant may
seek to recover damages against the private corporation acting under the color of
state law by pursuing a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.229 The litigant may
also attempt to pursue a Bivens action under the state constitution.230
A. The Rise of PrivatePrisonsand the Malesko Problem at the State Level
The origins of the modern private prison business can be traced to the mid-1980s
during the anti-government, pro-free enterprise sentiments of the Reagan era.231 At
that time across the country, prisons were bulging as a result of harsher drug laws
and stricter sentencing rules, yet taxpayers were resisting paying for more
correctional facilities.2 32 The private contractors offered the perfect solution since
they could house some of the inmates and do so at a lower cost than governmentoperated prisons.23 3 As officials in a number of states were lured by cheaper
incarceration costs, state legislatures began enacting statutes permitting private
corporations to perform what had previously been considered a function that should
be performed exclusively by the government.234
Since then there has been an exponential increase in the number of private
prisons and the prisoners they hold.235 Over the last two decades, the industry
overcame considerable skepticism to become a billion-dollar business. 236 As of

226. See Charles W. Thomas, Private Adult Correctional Facility Census (2001), available at
http://web.crim.ufl.edu/pcp/census/200/lChart3.html (last visited Apr. 18, 2003); The Rise andDecline ofPrivate
Prisons in the U.S., at http://www.goodjobsfirst.org/pd.PDF (last visited Mar. 1, 2003).
227. See Malesko, 534 U.S. at 81-82 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
228. See Lawson v. ULburdi, 114 F. Supp. 2d 31 (D.R.I. 2000) (discussing the possibility of affording relief
for an inmate who allegedly suffered a violation of his constitutional rights at the hands of a private detentional
facility).
229. See id. at 38; see also Giron v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 14 F. Supp. 2d 1245 (D.N.M. 1998) (holding that
a correctional officer was acting under color of state law for purposes of section 1983 when he raped a female
inmate).
230. See Gay Law Students Assoc. v. Pacific Tel. & Telegraph Co., 595 P.2d 592,601-03 (Cal. 1979) (citing
Bivens, the court finds a damages action for violation of equal protection provision); Newell v. City of Elgin, 340
N.E.2d 344 (El. App. Ct. 1976) (citing Bivens, the court finds a damages action for illegal search and seizure);
Moresi v. Dept. of Wildlife & Fisheries, 567 So. 2d 1081, 1091-93 (La. 1990) (damages action for illegal search
and seizure relying on framers' intent, English common law, the Magna Carta, and Bivens); Strauss v. State, 330
A.2d 646 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1974) (citing Bivens, the court finds a damage action for due process
violation).
231. The Rise and Declineof Private Prisons,supra note 226.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. RICHARD W. HARDING, PRIVATE PRISONS AND PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY 2 (1997).

236. The Rise and Decline of Private Prisons,supra note 226.
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2001, there were 151 privately operated adult correctional facilities in the United
States. 7 In privatization, "the state remains the ultimate paymaster and the
opportunity for private profit is found only in the ability of the contractor to deliver
' In
the agreed services at a cost below the negotiated sum."238
delegating some of its
police power to the private sector, the state inevitably delegates some of its
authority to the private sector and the key issue becomes "whether there still is
present that degree of public accountability and control that must always be
requisite when the state exercises its police power over the citizen., 239 One means
of assuring public accountability is by allowing litigants whose constitutional rights
have been violated to pursue an action against the corporation acting under color of
state law pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.240 A secondary means is to imply a cause
of action against the state under the state constitution when the state delegates its
authority to private corporations.241
B. Causes ofAction Against Private Corporationsunder 42 U.S.C. § 1983
A defendant in a civil rights action filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is liable only if
' A
the challenged conduct occurred "under the color of state law."242
person acts
under color of state law when she exercises the power possessed by virtue of state
law because she is clothed with the authority of state law. 243 In West v. Atkins, 244 the

Supreme Court held that a physician who was under contract with the state to
provide medical services to inmates at a state prison hospital on a part-time basis
acted "under color of state law" for purposes of section 1983 when he treated an
inmate.245 Since then, however, the Court has declined to specifically address the
issue of whether private corporations under contract with the state to operate
correctional facilities are liable under section 1983.246 Thus, district courts have
been left to interpret the state action problem and determine whether private
corporations have been sufficiently clothed with state authority so as to render them
liable under section 1983. The district courts have varied somewhat in their
application of section 1983 liability against private actors clothed with state
authority. While some district courts have foreclosed section 1983 recovery against
private entities, others have incorporated that avenue of relief as a part of their state
law.

237. Thomas, supra note 226.
238. HARDING, supranote 235, at 2.

239. Id.
240. See Giron v. Corr.Servs. Corp., 14 F. Supp. 2d 1245, 1251 (D.N.M. 1998) (holding that acorrectional
officer was acting under color of state law for purposes of section 1983 when he raped a female inmate).
241. See Brown v. State, 674 N.E.2d 1129, 1141 (N.Y. 1996) (holding cause of action to recover damages
may be asserted against state for violation of equal protection and search and seizure clauses of the state
constitution, citing Bivens).
242. 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
243. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42 (1988).
244. Id.
245. Id.at 57.
246. Richardson v. McKnight, 521 U.S. 399, 412 (1997) (holding that private prison guards who are
employees of a private prison management firm in contract with the state to operate a prison are not entitled to
qualified immunity from suit by prisoners charging a violation of section 1983 and explicitly declining to determine
whether the defendants acted under color of state law).
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The District Court of Rhode Island, in Lawson v. Liburdi,247 denied the plaintiff
any relief under either a Bivens or section 1983 action against a private detention
facility. 248 In that case, a federal pretrial detainee filed a complaint against
employees of a private detention facility that was owned by a public corporation
created by the city. 24 9 Although not originally pled by the plaintiff, the court sua
sponte requested that the parties brief and argue the issue of whether the named
defendants, employees of a private corporation, acted "under color of state law" for
purposes of a Bivens or a section 1983 action.250
In addressing the liability of the private corporation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the
main issue was whether the federal constitutional deprivations alleged by the
plaintiff at the hands of the defendants constituted state action for the purposes of
the statute.25 ' In determining whether there was direct state action, the district court
analogized to the Supreme Court case of Lebron v. NationalRailroad Passenger
Corp.25 2 Accordingly, because the city did not maintain permanent control over the
detention center, the district court concluded the defendants were not directly linked
'
to the state and did not constitute an "arm of the state."253
The district court analyzed the actions of the detention facility under the three
state action tests articulated by the Supreme Court25 4 and did not find a link between
the defendant and the state to make it liable under section 1983.255 First, in order to
establish liability under the nexus test, the state must have exercised coercive power
over the decision of the private corporation or provided significant encouragement,
either covert or overt.256 Since the state had no connection with the defendant's
decision to refuse the plaintiff a vegetarian diet, the nexus test was not satisfied.257
Second, because the private detention center was not financed by the state, and no
judgment rendered against employees of the private detention center would be paid

247. 114 F. Supp. 2d 31 (D.R.I.2000).
248. Id. at 33. Plaintiff brought claims pursuant to Bivens, alleging that the employees violated the First
Amendment's Free Exercise Clause, the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment,
and the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause.
249. Lawson, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 33-34.
250. Id. at 33. With respect to the Bivens claim, the district court concluded, "Bivens is more restrictive than
42 U.S.C. § 1983 and applies only to federal officials acting under federal authority to deprive a person of their
rights under the Constitution and laws of the United States." Id. at 33 (relying on Fletcher v. R.I. Hosp. Trust Nat'l
Bank, 496 F.2d 927, 932 n.8 (1st Cir. 1974)). Defendants in that case were employees of a private facility, hired
by a public corporation created by the city to operate the detention facility. Id. at 37. Thus, they were not affiliated
with the federal government in any way and consequently not subject to liability under Bivens. Id.
251. Id.at 38.
252. 513 U.S. 374 (1995) (holding that Amtrak was a part of the federal government for the purposes of a
First Amendment claim because the federal government created it by enactment of special legislation to further
governmental objectives and retained permanent control over the corporation's activities).
253. Lawson, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 38.
254. Id. The Supreme Court has developed three tests: the nexus test, which focuses on the government's
involvement in the activity of the private party; the symbiotic relationship test, which looks to the mutual
interdependence of the private party with the government; and the traditional public function test, which holds
constitutionally accountable private entities performing a function that has been the exclusive domain of the
government. See Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004 (1982) (the nexus test); Burton v. Wilmington Parking
Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 725 (1961) (symbiotic relationship test); Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 842 (1982)
(traditional public function test). See also Rodriguez-Garcia v. Davila, 904 F.2d 90, 96 (1st Cir. 1990).
255. Lawson, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 41.
256. Id. at 39 (quoting Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004 (1982)).
257. Id. at 41.
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out of the state treasury, the symbiotic relationship test was not satisfied. 258 Finally,
the district court relied on the Supreme Court's holding in Richardson v.
McKnight259 that "correctional facilities have never been exclusively public" and,
therefore, the public function test was not satisfied.26 °
Although Lawson v. Liburdi261 is an example of a district court declining to
impose section 1983 liability on a private detention facility, that case is easily
distinguishable from other cases involving contracts between private corporations
and state correctional facilities. The nature of the relationship between the state and
the private detention facility was far too attenuated to conclude the private entity
operated under color of state law. 262 However, cases in which the nature of the
relationship between the private entity and the state are not so attenuated produce
a different result.263
In Richardson, the Supreme Court held that employees of a private prison
management firm were not entitled to qualified immunity from suit by prisoners
charging a violation of section 1983.2" However, the Court declined to address
whether the defendants were liable under section 1983, even though they were
employed by a private firm,2 65 stating instead, "it is for the district court to
determine whether, under this Court's decision in Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co. ,266]
defendants actually acted under color of state law. 267 Since Richardson, several
district courts have applied the public function test and found private contractors
who run prisons acted under color of state law for purposes of section 1983.268
In Giron v. Corrections Corp. of America,269 the District Court of New Mexico
held that a correctional officer was acting under color of state law when he raped
a female inmate. 27" Further, the officer was not immune from suit as a state
employee under the state Tort Claims Act and thus could be liable for compensatory
and punitive damages. 271' The plaintiff in Giron was an inmate at the New Mexico
Women's Correctional Facility (NMWCF) in Grants, New Mexico.272 The

258. Id. at 40 (quoting Rodriguez-Garcia v. Davila, 904 F.2d 90, 98 (lst Cir. 1990)).
259. 521 U.S. at 405.
260. Lawson, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 39.
261. Id.
262. Id. at 41. The complaint was filed against employees of a private detention facility owned by a public
corporation created by the city.
263. See Giron v. Corr.Servs. Corp. ofAm., 14 F. Supp. 2d 1245 (D.N.M. 1998) (holding that acorrectional
officer was acting under color of state law for purposes of section 1983 when he raped a female inmate).
264. Richardson, 512 U.S. at 13.
265. Id.
266. 457 U.S. 922 (1982).
267. Id. at 935.
268. See Street v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 102 F.3d 810, 814 (6th Cir. 1996) (holding that a private company
performing the function of incarcerating inmates was acting under color of state law); Kesler v. King, 29 F. Supp.
2d 356,370-71 (S.D. Tex. 1998) (same); Blumel v. Mylander, 919 F. Supp. 423,426-27 (M.D. Fla. 1996) (holding
that private contractor that contracted with Florida county jail was state actor for purposes of section 1983);
Lemoine v. New Horizons Ranch & Ctr., 990 F. Supp. 498,502-03 (N.D. Tex. 1998) (holding that private company
that contracted with state to assume state's responsibility for care of troubled juveniles was a state actor for
purposes of section 1983 under public function analysis).
269. 14 F. Supp. 2d 1245 (D.N.M. 1998).
270. id. at 1251.
271. Id.
272. Id. at 1246.
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Corrections Corporation of America (CCA), a private for-profit corporation,
operated the NMWCF pursuant to a contract with the State of New Mexico
Corrections Department.273 The court applied the public function test and concluded
the defendant was able to gain entry and access to the plaintiff's cell to commit the
constitutional violation only because he was authorized as a corrections officer to
administer routine checks of the inmates.274 In the analysis of the public function
test, the court rejected the notion that the Supreme Court's decision in Richardson
foreclosed its determination that the operation of correctional facilities is a
traditional governmental function. 275 The court went on to state, "The function of
incarcerating people, whether done publicly or privately, is the exclusive
prerogative of the state. 276 Since the operation of correctional facilities is a
traditional government function, private entities that are delegated that government
function by the state are subject to liability under the federal Constitution. 27 7 The
court concluded, "government function doctrine applies in New Mexico when the
' Because the
state delegates the running of a prison to a private contractor."278
defendant used his badge of authority to gain access to the plaintiff s cell, he acted
under color of state law.279 Therefore, his conduct was a result of state action.280
The court next addressed the defendant's immunity from suit under the state Tort
Claims Act. 281' The defendant argued that if he was considered a state actor acting
under the color of state law, then he should be immune from suit because the New
Mexico Tort Claims Act had not waived immunity for state corrections officers.282
However, the court concluded the defendant was not a public employee of the state
but rather an employee of a private corporation acting under the color of state
law. 283 Accordingly, the defendant was not immune from liability because he was
not a public employee within the meaning of the New Mexico Tort Claims Act.284
The Act defines a "public employee" as "any officer, employee or servant of a
governmental entity, excluding independent contractors except for individuals
defined in Paragraphs (7), (8), (10) and (14) of this subsection. 285 Under that
contractor, not a
definition, the defendant was an employee of an independent
286
suit.
from
immune
not
was
he
and
public employee,
The holding in Giron was compelled by the close relationship between the
private contractor and the state, a relationship that did not exist in Lawson.287

273. Id.
274. Id. at 1248.
275. Id.
276. Id.
277. Id. at 1250.
278. Id.
279. id. at 1251.
280. Id.
281. Id.
282. Id.
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. Id. at 1252 (quoting N.M. STAT. ANN. 1978, § 41-4-3(F) (Michie 1996)).
286. Id. at 1252.
287. In Giron, the Correction Corporation of America, a private corporation, operated the New Mexico
Women's Correction Facility pursuant to a contract with the State of New Mexico Corrections Department. Id. at
1247. While in Lawson, the correctional facility was operated by a private corporation under contract with a public
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District courts are charged with determining whether private entities in contract
with the state are acting under color of state law for purposes of section 1983
liability and, thus, the results in any given case will vary.288 The decisions in
Lawson and Gironprovide useful guidelines as they present two different situations,
and the holding in each was compelled by the relationship between the state and the
private contractor." 9
If there is no cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, litigants must look for
another mechanism to remedy the injury. 2" The injury could be a violation of the
state constitution.2 9' The inquiry then becomes whether a cause of action can be
implied under the state constitution and whether the Tort Claims Act would bar that
action.2 92 If the Tort Claims Act does not bar action, there must be sufficient action
by the state in delegating some of the state's police power to the private corporation.
C. Bivens Actions under State Constitutions
States that have recognized the existence of implied causes of action against both
individuals and governments for monetary damages for violations of state
constitutions typically have patterned their reasoning on section 874A of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts,293 analogies to Bivens actions,294 or common-law
antecedents to constitutional provisions.295 Other state courts considering the issue
have refused to imply a cause of action for violations of state constitutional
provisions, usually on the grounds that adequate alternative remedies existed.296

corporation that the city statutorily created. Lawson, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 40.
288. Richardson, 521 U.S. at 413. Compare Giron, 14 F. Supp. 2d at 1248 (holding that an employee of a
private corporation was a state actor for purposes of section 1983 since the function of incarcerating people,
whether done privately or publicly, was the exclusive prerogative of the state) with Lawson, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 4041 (holding that a private corporation was not a state actor for purposes of section 1983 since operating a prison
has never been the exclusive prerogative of the state).
289. See supra notes 284-285.
290. See Paul R. Owen, Reticent Revolution. Prospects for Damage Suits under the New Mexico Bill of
Rights, 25 N.M. L. REV. 173, 183 (1995).
291. See Brown v. State, 647 N.E.2d 1129, 1142 (N.Y. 1996) (recognizing a cause of action for damages
against the state for violation of equal protection and search and seizure clauses of the state constitution).
292. See Caillouette v. Hercules, 113 N.M. 492, 496 (N.M. Ct. App. 1992) (declining to imply a cause of
action for damages under the New Mexico Constitution since there was no waiver of immunity under the New
Mexico Tort Claims Act); Blea v. City of Espanola, 117 N.M. 217, 220-22 (N.M. Ct. App. 1994) (declining to
imply a cause of action for damages under the New Mexico Constitution; citing Caillouette, 113 N.M. at 496).
293. See Brown, 674 N.E.2d at 1141.
294. Gay Law Students Assoc. v. Pac. Tel. & Telegraph Co., 595 P.2d 592, 601-03 (Cal. 1979) (citing
Bivens, the court finds a damages action for violation of equal protection provision); Newell v. City of Elgin, 340
N.E.2d 344 (111.App. Ct. 1976) (citing Bivens, the court finds a damages action for illegal search and seizure);
Moresi v. Dept. of Wildlife & Fisheries, 567 So. 2d 1081, 1091-93 (La. 1990) (damages action for illegal search
and seizure relying on framers' intent, English common law, the Magna Carta, and Bivens); Strauss v. State, 330
A.2d 646 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1974) (citing Bivens, the court finds a damage action for due process
violation).
295. Widgeon v. E. Shore Hosp. Ctr., 479 A.2d 921 (Md. 1984) (recognizing existence for common-law
action for violations of search and seizure and due process violations; citing English common law, the Magna
Carta, and Bivens); Jackson v. Consol. Rail Corp., 538 A.2d 1310 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1988) (recognizing
that punitive damages may be awarded where appropriate for improper discharge in violation of constitution);
Corum v. Univ. of N.C. Through Bd. of Governors, 413 S.E.2d 276 (N.C. 1992).
296. Provens v. Stark Cty. Bd. of Mental Retardation & Dev. Disabilities, 594 N.E.2d 959 (Ohio 1992);
Figueroa v. State, 604 P.2d 1198 (Haw. 1979).
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States that recognize implied causes of action under state constitutions are more
likely to provide monetary relief for violations of state constitutions against a
private corporation because those states are concerned with the policies of
deterrence and remedying the violation of constitutional rights.297 These were
essentially the policy reasons behind Bivens that were articulated by Justice Harlan
in his concurrence.2 98 State courts concerned with such policies are not likely to

refrain from providing relief when a private corporation or an employee of that
corporation has committed the constitutional violation because the same policy
goals apply: permitting recovery would deter such violations and remedy the
impermissible violation of constitutional rights.299
The concerns expressed by those states bear a striking resemblance to the
concerns articulated by the dissent in Malesko. °° Each is concerned with the full
protection of constitutional rights. 30 The dissent in Malesko warns that the
majority's reliance on state tort law and alternative remedies "jeopardizes the
protection of constitutional rights."30 2 Similarly, in Brown v. State,"3 the New York

court held that an implied cause of action for damages against the state was
necessary and appropriate to ensure the full realization of the rights guaranteed in
its constitution and that no other remedy, injunctive or declaratory, would relieve
the constitutional violation.3" Therefore, the states that are aligned with the
dissent's position are likely to provide for monetary relief against private
corporations acting under the color of state law, as the dissenters in Malesko would
have.3" 5 This is demonstrated by the policy concerns shared by both: the protection
of constitutional rights and the deterrence of such violations, whether state or
federal.306
On the other hand, state courts declining to recognize an implied cause of action
under the state constitution are not likely to provide monetary relief against private
corporations because those states are concerned with separation of powers and
would prefer to defer to the legislative body to make such decisions.30 7 In addition,

297. See, e.g., Brown v. State, 674 N.E.2d 1129 (N.Y. 1996) (holding that acause of action to recover money
damages may be asserted against the state for violation of equal protection and search and seizure clauses of the
New York Constitution); Binnette v. Sabo, 710 A.2d 688 (Conn. 1998) (recognizing a cause of action fordamages
to redress the infringements of rights protected under search and seizure and arrest sections of the Connecticut
Constitution).
298. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 398-411 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring).
299. See, e.g., Brown, 674 N.E.2d at 1141 ("By recognizing a narrow remedy for violations of sections 11
and 12 of article I of the State Constitution, we provide appropriate protection against official misconduct at the
State level.").
300. See Malesko, 534 U.S. at 80 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("And aside from undermining uniformity, the
Court's reliance on state tort law will jeopardize the protection of the full scope of federal constitutional rights.").
301. Compare supra note 296 with supra note 297.
302. Malesko, 534 U.S. at 79 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
303. 674 N.E.2d 1129, 1140 (N.Y. 1998).
304. Id. These policies are at the heart of the Bivens rationale and were emphasized by Justice Harlan in his
concurring opinion in Bivens, 403 U.S. at 398-411 (Harlan, J., concurring).
305. See Malesko, 534 U.S. at 78 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
306. Compare Brown, 674 N.E.2d at 1140-41, with Malesko, 534 U.S. at 80-82.
307. See, e.g., Figuero v. Hawaii, 604 P.2d 1198, 1205-06 (Haw. 1979) (declining to recognize an implied
cause of action under its state constitution because there was no waiver of sovereign immunity and the court held
it was not free to abolish the state's sovereign immunity).
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those states are concerned with duplicative avenues of relief and, if an adequate
alternative remedy is available, those courts refuse to recognize another." 8
Those states are drawing from the same analysis as the majority and concurring
opinions in Malesko.30 9 That position centers its analysis on the limitations rather
than the expansions of Bivens actions.3 1 ° The majority in Malesko presented the
issue as an "expansion" of Bivens.3 ' The majority also noted Malesko had
alternative avenues of relief,312 a concern echoed by those states declining to
recognize an implied cause of action. 1 3 That position is bolstered by deference to
the legislative bodies, both state and federal.314 The Ohio Supreme Court,3 15
examining the Bivens line of cases, noted that the federal judiciary "has generally
exercised extreme caution" in fashioning monetary remedies for violations of
individual constitutional rights. 316 Therefore, given the separation of powers
doctrine relied upon by that position, it is unlikely that those states will imply a
cause of action under the state constitution against private corporations, just as the
majority declined to do in Malesko.3 17
D. Implied Causes of Action under the New Mexico Constitution
New Mexico courts have never directly addressed the issue of whether an
implied cause of action for damages under its constitution should be recognized
against a private corporation or otherwise. 318 New Mexico has no statute that
3 9
directly authorizes suits for damages for violations of the state constitution.3 20
Furthermore, in New Mexico, the Tort Claims Act governs sovereign immunity.
The Tort Claims Act was passed by the legislature in response to Hicks v. State,32'
in which the New Mexico Supreme Court effectively abolished sovereign immunity

308. See, e.g., Provens v. Stark Cty. Bd. of Mental Retardation & Dev. Disabilities, 594 N.E.2d 959 (Ohio
1992) (holding that if statutory remedies exist for violations of constitutional provisions, private employees do not
have a private cause of action for violations of their state constitutional rights).
309. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 75 (2001) (Scalia, J., concurring); id. at 74.
310. Id. at 74.
311. Id. at 70.
312. "[Malesko] is not a plaintiff in search of a remedy as in Bivens and Davis." Id. at 74.
313. Provens, 594 N.E.2d at 959 (holding that if statutory remedies exist for violations of constitutional
provisions, private employees do not have a private cause of action for violations of their state constitutional
rights).
314. "There is even greater reason to abandon [inventing implications] in the constitutional field, since an
'implication' imagined in the Constitution can presumably not even be repudiated by Congress." Malesko, 534 U.S.
at 75 (Scalia, J., concurring).
315. Provens, 594 N.E.2d 959.
316. Id. at 962.
317. Malesko, 534 U.S. at 67 n.3.
318. See Owen, supra note 290, at 174 (providing a more in-depth analysis of relevant New Mexico case
law).
319. At least two states, Arkansas and Maine, have fashioned Civil Rights Acts that provide for direct causes
of action for damages for violations of their state constitutions. ARK. CODEANN. § 16-123-103 (Michie 1987); ME.
REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 4682 (West 1993).
320. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-4-4(A) (Michie 1996) provides:
A governmental entity and any public employee while acting within the scope of duty are
granted immunity from liability for any tort except as waived by Sections 41-4-5 through 41-412 NMSA 1978. Waiver of this immunity shall be limited to and governed by the provisions of
Sections 41-4-13 through 41-4-25 NMSA 1978.
321. 88 N.M. 588, 544 P.2d 1153 (N.M. 1975).
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in its entirety.322 The Act reinstated sovereign immunity for any governmental entity
and any public employee for all torts except for those specifically waived by the
Act.323 The legislature specifically mentioned state constitutional violations in two
provisions of the Tort Claims Act.324 Specifically, section 41-4-4(D)(2) of the Act
requires that a governmental entity must pay any damage award assessed against a
government employee acting within the scope of his employment if that award was
a result of a violation of rights guaranteed by the New Mexico Constitution.325 The
Act fails to enumerate the specific causes of action that permissibly state a claim for
a "violation of [the] rights" noted in section 41-4-4(D)(2).326 However, the damages
provision of the Act3 27 specifically waives immunity of law enforcement officers for
violations of "any rights, privileges or immunities secured by the constitution and
laws of... New Mexico.... "328 Therefore, in New Mexico, the state is immune from
liability for a violation of a state constitutional right except when a law enforcement
officer commits the violation.3 29 Since the Tort Claims Act waives immunity for law
enforcement officers acting under the scope of their employment, it provides an
avenue of relief for plaintiffs who seek damages from private corporations operating
correctional facilities, since those private actors are law enforcement officers.330
New Mexico courts have considered the issue of whether to recognize a damages
action against law enforcement officers subject to the waiver of immunity under the
Tort Claims Act. In Caillouette v. Hercules, Inc., 33 a widow brought claims for
wrongful death and violations of the decedent's state constitutional rights to safety
and happiness.332 The court held there was no waiver of sovereign immunity for
violations of article II, section 4 of the New Mexico Constitution, 33 claiming, "If
we were to base a waiver of sovereign immunity on these provisions, the exceptions
thus created would eliminate the principle of sovereign immunity., 334 However, the
court did not explain why there would be no waiver of sovereign immunity for those
provisions. Conceivably, the court's reluctance to apply the waiver of sovereign
immunity to law enforcement officers stems from the ambiguous language
contained in article UI, section 4.335 The Caillouette court determined that an

322. Plaintiffs in that case brought negligence suit against the state highway department. Id. at 588,544 P.2d
at 1155-57. The court examined the history of sovereign immunity in New Mexico and other states and concluded

that it was a common law doctrine that had become antiquated and anachronistic. Id. Accordingly, the court
abolished sovereign immunity in all contexts. Id. at 590-92, 544 P.2d at 1155-57.
323. N.M. STAT. ANN. 1978, § 41-4-4(A) (1996). See N.M. STAT. ANN. 1978 §§ 41-4-5 to 41-4-25 (1996),
which set forth the waivers of sovereign immunity.
324. Owen, supra note 290, at 176.
325. Id.

326.
327.
328.
329.
330.
331.
332.
333.

Id.
N.M. STAT. ANN. 1978 § 41-4-4(D)(2) (1996).
Id.
Id.
See Owen, supra note 290, at 181.
113 N.M. 492, 827 P.2d 1306 (N.M. Ct. App. 1992).
Id. at 495-96, 827 P.2d at 1309-10.
N.M. CONST. art. II, § 4 provides, "All persons are born equally free, and have certain natural, inherent,

and inalienable rights, among which are the rights of enjoying and defending life and liberty, of acquiring,

possessing and protecting property, and of seeking and obtaining safety and happiness."
334. Caillouette, 113 N.M. at 497, 827 P.2d at 1311.
335.

See supra note 333.
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official's immunity for violation of article II, section 4 precluded that section from
providing cognizable rights.336
The court of appeals readdressed the issue of whether a law enforcement officer
could be sued for violation of constitutional rights based on the waiver of sovereign
337 In that
immunity contained in the Tort Claims Act in Blea v. City of Espanola.
case the plaintiffs sued police officers and their supervisor seeking recovery for
wrongful death, personal injuries, and violations of article I, sections 4 and 18 of
the New Mexico Constitution.3 38 The court summarily dismissed the claims under
article II, section 4 relying on Caillouette, stating that a "[w]aiver of immunity
based on such constitutional grounds would emasculate the immunity preserved in
the Tort Claims Act., 339 The court declined to decide whether the claims for
damages under article II, section 18 were subject to the waiver of sovereign
immunity under the Tort Claims Act. 4 ° Instead, the case was remanded to the trial
court to determine whether the plaintiffs should be permitted to proceed under a
theory of waiver of sovereign immunity under article II, section 18, and, if so, what
the remedies allowable under that theory would be. 34' As a result, the Blea holding
failed to provide guidelines for future litigants seeking monetary redress against law
enforcement officers for violations of their state constitutional rights based on the
waiver of immunity contained in the Tort Claims Act.
As of 2001, there were eight privately owned and operated adult correctional
facilities in New Mexico. 342 Therefore, the Malesko problem is likely to arise in
New Mexico. After examining the approaches of other states and the current status
of constitutional tort jurisprudence in New Mexico, it is difficult to determine if a
cause of action for damages against a private corporation acting under the color of
state law would be permitted. Unlike the concerns expressed by other states, the
relevant cases in New Mexico do not articulate the same policy concerns as those
articulated by the dissenters in Malesko.343 Recall that those states were aligned
with the concerns of the dissenters in Malesko, namely, full protection of
constitutional guarantees and deterrence of such violations. 3 " However, the New
Mexico cases on point do not articulate these policy concerns .345 The chief concern
seems to be compliance with the Tort Claims Act, and reluctance to apply the

336. Caillouette, 113 N.M. at 495, 827 P.2d at 1310.
337. 117 N.M. 217, 870 P.2d 755 (N.M. 1994).
338. Id. at 219-22, 870 P.2d at 759-60.
339. Id. at 221, 870 P.2d at 759 (citing Caillouette, 113 N.M. at 407, 827 P.2d at 1311).
340. Id. at 222, 870 P.2d at 760.
341. Id.
342. Thomas, supra note 226.
343. Compare Caillouette, 113 N.M. at 497, 827 P.2d at 1311 (declining to imply a cause of action under
state constitution because there was no waiver of sovereign immunity) and Blea, 117 N.M. at 221, 870 P.2d at 759
(declining to imply a cause of action under state constitution; citing Caillouette) with Malesko, 534 U.S. at 80
(stating that in denying to imply a cause of action the majority position jeopardizes the protection of the full scope
of constitutional rights).
344. CompareBrown v. State, 674 N.E.2d 1129, 1141 (N.Y. 1996) (stating that "[bly recognizing a narrow
remedy for violations of sections 11 and 12 of article I of the State constitution, we provide appropriate protection
against official misconduct at the State level") with Malesko, 534 U.S. at 80 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (stating that
"aside from undermining uniformity, the Court's reliance on state tort law will jeopardize the protection of the full
scope of federal constitutional rights").
345. See supra note 343.
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waiver of
sovereign immunity to law enforcement officers stems from that
346
concern.

However, at the same time, the relevant New Mexico cases do not appear to be
directly aligned with the policy concerns of the majority opinion in Malesko, nor
those states that decline to imply causes of action for damages for violations of their
respective constitutions.347 The policies of Malesko and those states declining to
imply causes of action under their constitutions were compliance with the doctrine
of separation of powers and absence of alternative remedies.14 ' Although the New
Mexico Court of Appeals in Blea refused to apply the waiver of sovereign immunity
for law enforcement officers to article II, section 4, the court specifically left open
the issue of whether the waiver applied to article II, section 18. 4 Moreover, the
policies expressed by the court of appeals in Blea in refusing to apply the waiver of
sovereign immunity were not separation of powers or lack of alternative
remedies. The court was concerned with compliance with the Tort Claims Act
and the policies surrounding it and its exceptions.3 51 ' Therefore, the relevant New
Mexico cases do not express the concerns articulated by the Supreme Court in
Malesko or by states refusing to imply causes of action under their constitutions.352
The issue in New Mexico of whether an implied cause of action for damages
against a law enforcement officer would be permitted is still wide open. The courts
in New Mexico have not directly aligned themselves with either side of the debate.
Litigants in the state have an opportunity for recovery against a private corporation,
provided the litigant jumps the sovereign immunity burden that prevents most from
recovery against the state and its actors. 353 However, other than article II, section 4,
the courts in New Mexico have not directly addressed the issue of whether
constitutional violations committed by law enforcement officers are subject to the
waiver of immunity contained in the Tort Claims Act.354 In this respect, the Tort
Claims Act itself is a "statute that authorizes suits for damages," at least with
respect to law enforcement officers.

346. Id.
347. Compare Figuero, 604 P.2d at 1205-06 (declining to recognize an implied cause of action under its state
constitution because there was no waiver of sovereign immunity and the court held it was not free to abolish the
state's sovereign immunity) and Provens, 594 N.E.2d 959 (holding that if statutory remedies exist for violations
of constitutional provisions, private employees do not have a private cause of action for violations of their state
constitutional rights) and Malesko, 534 U.S. at 67 n.3 ("We have retreated from our previous willingness to imply
a cause of action where Congress has not provided one.") with supra note 343.
348. Malesko, 534 U.S. at 67 n.3; Figuero, 604 P.2d at 1205-06 (using separation of powers rationale to deny
cause of action); Provens, 594 N.E.2d at 963-64 (using existence of adequate alternative remedies as rationale to
deny cause of action).
349. Blea, 117 N.M. at 222, 870 P.2d at 760.
350. Id. at 221, 870 P.2d at 759.
351. Id. at 222, 870 P.2d at 760 ("However, the issue in this case is not what our constitution protects or does
not protect. The issue is the scope of the acts for which the legislature has waived immunity.").
352. See supra note 344.
353. See Caillouene,113 N.M. at 497-98, 827 P.2d at 1311-12 (N.M. Ct. App. 1992) (declining to imply
cause of action under article I section 4 of state constitution because of sovereign immunity); Blea, 117 N.M. at
221-22, 870 P.2d at 759-60 (declining to imply cause of action under state constitution; citing Caillouette).
354. See Blea, 117 N.M. at 222, 870 P.2d at 760 (declining to imply a cause of action under article ]I, section
4 of state constitution because of sovereign immunity but declining to address whether the waiver of sovereign
immunity applies to article II, section 18 of state constitution).
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VI. CONCLUSION
Although the effect Malesko will have on state constitutional tort jurisprudence
is uncertain, the two positions surrounding the debate have been made sufficiently
clear by the opinion.355 By examining the policies surrounding the constitutional tort
jurisprudence in any given jurisdiction, a future litigant seeking monetary recovery
against a private corporation acting under the color of state law will have a good
indication of how his or her state court will determine the issue. The policies
expressed by the majority and dissenting opinion in Malesko serve as a guide to
future state litigants. Those states aligned with the policies expressed by the
majority in Malesko likely will decline to recognize a cause of action under the state
constitution for damages. Meanwhile, those states closely aligned with the policies
expressed by the dissent in Malesko more than likely will imply a cause of action
for damages under the state constitution.

355. Compare Malesko, 534 U.S. at 63 with id. at 78 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

